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Economics: An Emerging Small World?  
 
Summary 
The structures of social interaction affect individual behavior and economic 
performance in important ways. This leads us to ask: does the architecture of social 
interaction exhibit particular patterns and are these patterns stable over time? We 
examine interaction among economists by looking at the evolution of co-authorship 
relations over a thirty year period. We find that in the 1970's this world was quite 
fragmented with the largest interconnected group { the giant component { covering only 
15% of the population. However, by the 1990's economics was much more integrated, 
with the giant component covering over 40% of the population. The average distance 
between individuals was small and declined over the period, leading us to conclude that 
economics is an emerging small world. A crucial stable feature of the network over this 
period is the existence of several stars (economists with many co-authors each of whom 
have few collaborators and rarely work among themselves). The world of economics is 
thus a collection of inter-linked stars. We also find that a growth in the average number 
of co-authors is the main reason behind the growth in the giant component and the fall 
in average distances within it. The second part of the paper develops a simple 
theoretical model of collaboration in economics. We find that an unequal distribution of 
collaborations and inter- linked stars arise naturally in this environment. Falling costs of 
communication and increasing credit for joint research lead to greater co-authorship and 
this supports a larger giant component. 
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The structures of social interaction a®ect individual behavior and economic performance
in important ways.1 This leads us to ask: does the architecture of social interaction exhibit
particular patterns and are these patterns stable over time? The ¯rst part of this paper
empirically examines interaction among economists over a thirty year period from 1970
to 2000 while the second part of the paper presents a theoretical model of co-authorship
to account for the empirical ¯ndings.
Our empirical work looks at the world of economists who publish in journals and we
examine the evolution of co-authorship relations from 1970 to 2000. We split this period
into three ten year intervals, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-1999. Every publishing
author is a node in the network, and two nodes are linked if they have published a paper
or more together in the period under study.
We ¯rst summarize our ¯ndings on the aggregate properties of the network. We ¯nd
that the number of economists has grown sharply (140 %) in numbers and has more than
doubled in the period from 1970 to 2000. This ¯nding is consistent with the growth in the
number of ¯elds/specializations and in the corresponding set of ¯eld journals during this
period and it leads us to expect that the world has probably become more fragmented.
However, we ¯nd that in the 1990's economics is actually a much more integrated world
than it was in the 1970's: in the 1970's the largest group of interconnected economists
comprised only about 15% of the population, and there was a large number of small
groups. By contrast, in the 1990's there was one huge group of interconnected economists
with about 40% of the total population and all the other groups had shrunk in size sharply.
The numbers are worth mentioning here: in the 1970's the largest group of economists
contained about 5,200 economists while in the 1990's the largest group contained more
than 33,000 members. We next consider the level of connectedness within the largest
interconnected group. We note that the average number of co-authors is very low; for
instance, in the 1990's, a member of the giant group worked with 3 other economists
on average. Given the size of the giant group this leads us to expect that the average
distance between economists must be large. However, we ¯nd that average distance
between economists in this giant group is small (only 9.47 in the 1990's) and has fallen
signi¯cantly over time (despite the growth of the group). These ¯ndings put together lead
us to the view that economics is an emerging small world.2
1There is now a vast literature on the role of interaction structures. A variety of terms such as
local interaction, network e®ects, peer group e®ects, have been used. See e.g., Bala and Goyal (1998,
2001), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) on social learning, Goyal (1996) and Morris (2000) on norms of
coordination, Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) on norms of cooperation, Allen and Gale (2000) on
¯nancial fragility of di®erent inter-bank loan networks, Burt (1994) on social networks and individual
performance, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) on local interaction and crime, Hagerstrand
(1969) and Coleman (1966) on technological di®usion, Munshi (2003) on migration, Watkins (1991) on
spread of norms in fertility and marriage and Young (1998) on spread of norms on driving.
2The network terminology used here is formally de¯ned in section 2.
2What is it about the distribution and arrangement of links in the network that makes this
world small? Our ¯rst ¯nding is that the distribution of links is very unequal in the three
periods under study; there exists a fat tail in the distribution, with a signi¯cant number
of authors having a very large number of links. In the 1990's, for example, the average
number of collaborators (in the whole network) was 1.672 while the maximally connected
economist had more than 50 collaborators. Moreover, the clustering, which measures the
overlap among co-authors, was .157 in the 1990's network while the clustering for the
most connected economist was only .02. This shows that the most connected author had
many more links than his cohorts and also that he had very low overlaps among their
co-authors as compared to the average person in the network. These numbers lead us to
use the term `stars' for the most connected economists. Our second ¯nding is about the
role of these well connected nodes in integrating the network. In the 1990's over 40% of
the nodes were in the giant component but a deletion of the 5% most connected nodes
leaves less than 1% of the nodes in the giant component, thus completely destroying the
network. These ¯ndings lead us to conclude that the economics network is spanned by a
set of inter-linked stars and that this is a stable feature of the economics collaboration
network.
We next examine the role of the di®erent micro variables in explaining the main aggregate
changes noted above. We are specially interested in understanding the role of changes
in average number of collaborators versus changes in link patterns. Our main ¯nding is
that the increase in average number of collaborators is the crucial factor in explaining the
growth in the giant component and the fall in average distances. This conclusion seems
to contradict a widely held view that the world is becoming smaller because people are
forming `distant' links more often.3
These empirical ¯ndings are fascinating and we would like to develop a theory to account
for them. There is a large literature on the small world phenomenon in physics and
mathematics. This work takes as a given that the world is small; our empirical work,
however, shows that average distances and size of giant component in our network change
greatly over time. We therefore need a theoretical approach which can explain the stable
architectural features of the network (the inter-linked stars) as well as the changes in the
network (such as growing giant component).
In the second part of this paper we develop a simple incentives based model with the
following features. Research papers contain ideas and involve routine work; the quality
of a paper depends on the quality of the ideas contained in it. Individuals have ideas and
can do routine work; however, some people are better at generating high quality ideas
than others. Institutions reward individuals on their research output; this reward speci¯es
3In particular, our ¯nding appears to be in con°ict with the conclusion of a recent paper by Rosenblat
and Mobius (2003). Their paper studies economists publishing in 8 economics journals and focus on
average distances within the giant component. They argue that it is the change in link patterns that
accounts for lower average distance between economists. We discuss the reasons for the di®erent ¯ndings
in detail after presenting our results in section 3 below.
3a threshold level of output quality that is considered for evaluation and also speci¯es a
certain credit to single authored work and co-authored work. There are costs to writing
papers which increase in the number of papers written in a research area. Similarly there
are costs to meeting and working with others which are increasing in the number of co-
authors. Analysis of this model tells us that stars { which embody unequal distribution of
links and links between well connected and poorly connected players { arise naturally in an
academic environment with productivity di®erentials and the possibility of collaboration.
We show that equilibrium networks will contain inter-linked stars and hence will exhibit
short average distances. We also show that a decline in costs of communication and an
increase in credit to co-authored papers will both lead to an increase in the number of
collaborators and therefore an equilibrium network with a higher degree, something which
helps explain the growth in the size of the giant component.
We now place the paper in the context of on-going research in economics and physics.
There is a large body of research which argues that social interaction structure a®ects
individual behavior and economic performance (see the literature cited in footnote 1).
Then there is a pressing need for an empiricial study that investigates what the interaction
structure of real world social groups is, and how it is evolving over time. This is the
primary motivation behind the present paper. To the best of our knowledge our paper
is the ¯rst attempt in economics at empirically studying the structure of large evolving
social networks. Our analysis identi¯es stable features of a real world network as well
as clari¯es the nature of basic changes over time. The ¯ndings should form the starting
point for a systematic empirical and theoretical study of the economic e®ects of particular
structures.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on network formation.4 The distinctive
aspect of this literature is the use of individual incentives to derive predictions on network
architectures. Our paper contributes to this literature by developing a simple model of
co-author network formation to explain the patterns we observe in our empirical work.
Our paper may be seen as contributing to the literature on economics research. Recent
work on this subject includes Ellison (2002a, 2000b) and Laband and Tollison (2000),
among others. Our ¯ndings on the relative role of increased co-authoring and distant co-
authoring, respectively are related to themes discussed by other authors. In particular,
the increase in co-authorship has been noted and the reasons for it have been explored
in Hudson (1996), while the role of substantial and increasing informal intellectual col-
laboration is explored in Laband and Tollison (2000). A variety of arguments { such
as increasing specialization and the falling costs of communication among others { have
been proposed to explain increasing co-authorship among economists. Hamermesh and
Oster (2002) present evidence which suggests that collaboration among distant authors
has increased over the years.
4See Bala and Goyal (200), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Kranton and Minehart (2001) for early
work and Goyal (2003) and Jackson (2003) for surveys of recent developments.
4The empirical properties of large social and economic networks have been investigated
extensively by physicists in recent years. For comprehensive surveys of the work in physics
see Albert and Barab¶ asi (2002) and Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2002). This work focuses
on the statistical properties of large networks, and uses a variety of techniques ranging
from random graph theory to mean ¯eld analysis to elaborate on di®erent features of
observed networks. We brie°y discuss two ways in which our paper contributes to this
body of work. The ¯rst contribution is the incentives based approach we develop. We
believe that networks of scienti¯c collaboration are an outcome of deliberate decisions by
individual scientists. This means that the observed networks re°ect the technology of
production of knowledge and the incentives faced by individuals. We are thus interested
in developing a model where technology and incentive schemes are modelled explicitly
and we can study their e®ects on collaboration networks systematically. The second
contribution is our empirical work. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the ¯rst
to study the properties of a network over an extended period of time (thirty years) with
a view to understanding the stable and changing features of the network; earlier studies
have focused on short periods of time (the maximum period of time covered seems to
be 8 years, see Albert and Barab¶ asi (2002)). This di®erence in time horizon allows us
to study the emergence of the small world property. The present paper also appears
to be the ¯rst study of economics collaboration networks; existing work focuses on the
natural sciences, medical sciences and mathematics. This is interesting since networks in
other subjects exhibit di®erent properties. For example, the relative size of the largest
interconnected group of authors and the average number of co-authors seem to be very
di®erent in economics as compared to physics or medical sciences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basic notation and
de¯nitions. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis. Section 4 develops an incentives
based model to explain these network patterns while Section 5 concludes.
2 Networks
We start by setting down some basic notation which is useful to discuss network features
precisely. Let N = f1;2;::;ng be the set of nodes in a network. We shall refer to n as
the order of the network. We shall be looking at undirected links in this paper, and for
two persons/nodes i;j 2 N, we shall de¯ne gi;j 2 f0;1g as a link between them, with
gi;j = 1 signifying a link and gi;j = 0 signifying the absence of a link. If two persons have
published a paper together then they are said to have a link between them; if they have
published no papers together then they have no link. Thus the information on authors
and papers allows us to construct a network of collaboration. We shall say that there
is a path between i and j either if gi;j = 1 or if there is a set of distinct intermediate
co-authors j1;j2:::jn, such that gi;j1 = gj1;j2 = ::: = gjn;j = 1. The collection of all links
will be denoted by g. The set of nodes and the links between them will be referred to as
a network and denoted by G(N;g). Let Ni(G) = fj 2 N : gi;j = 1g, be the set of nodes
5with whom i has a link in network G. Let ´i(G) = jNi(G)j be the degree of node i in
network G, and de¯ne eta(g) =
P
i2N ´i(G)=n as the average degree in a network G.
In case ´1 = ::: = ´n = ´ we will refer to ´ as the degree of the network. In general the
degree is not constant across nodes/individuals and we are interested in the inequality
in the distribution of degree across nodes. To measure this inequality we will compute
Lorenz curves of the degree distribution. Suppose the set of nodes S ½ N is ordered, such
that i < j if and only if ´i < ´j for i;j 2 S, and denote ns = jSj as the number of nodes
in S and LS(h) =
Ph
i=1 ´i as the number of links in possession of the h least linked nodes.
Then the Lorenz curve for S is given by connecting the points
(h=ns;LS(h)=LS(ns)) 2 [0;1]
2:
for h = 0;:::;ns. The Lorenz curve measures the fraction of links that are in possession
of the x% least linked nodes. Note that perfect equality, that is a constant degree across
nodes in S, implies that the Lorenz curve follows the 45 degree diagonal.
Two persons belong to the same component if and only if there exists a path between
them. The path relation therefore de¯nes a partition of the network into components.
For a network G the partition will be denoted as P(G) = fC1;:::;Cmg with m ¸ 1. In
case m = 1 we have a connected network and in case m = n we have the empty network.
The components can be ordered in terms of their size, and we shall say that the network
has a giant component if the largest component ¯lls a relatively large part of the graph
and all other components are small, typically of order O(logn). We denote the size of the
giant component as ngc(G).
The geodesic distance between two nodes i and j in network G is the length of the shortest
path between them, and will be denoted by d(i;j;G). If there is no path between i and
j in a network G then we shall set d(i;j;G) = 1. In case G is connected, the average







If G is not connected then the average distance is formally speaking in¯nite. In our data
the network is not connected and so to study distances we shall use the average distance
in the giant component as a proxy for the average distance in the network. The maximum
distance between any pair of nodes in a network G is referred to as the diameter of the




The clustering coe±cient of a network G is a measure of the correlation between links of







6for all i 2 N0 ´ fi 2 N : ´i ¸ 2g, This ratio tells us what percentage of a person's
co-authors who are co-authors of each other. The clustering coe±cient for the network G
can be obtained by averaging across all persons in a network. We shall use an averaging
scheme which gives more weight to authors with a higher degree. This leads us to the








i2N0 ´i(´i ¡ 1)
A star network is a network where one node, referred to as the center node, is linked to
all other nodes in the graph while all these other nodes are only linked to the center node.
In some networks, there is no single center of the network, but there is a small number of
extremely well connected nodes and the partners of each of these nodes have almost no
other connections. We shall, somewhat informally, refer to these well connected nodes as
`stars'.
We shall say that a network G exhibits small world properties if it satis¯es the following
properties:
1. The number of nodes is very large as compared to the average number of links,
n >> ´(G).
2. The network is integrated; the giant component exists and covers a large share of
the population.
3. Clustering is high, C(G) >> ´(G)=n.
4. The average distance between nodes in the giant component is small, d(G) is of
order lnn.
This de¯nition is a modi¯ed version of the notion of small world presented in Watts
(1999).
3 Empirical Patterns
We study the world of economists who published in journals which are included in the
list of EconLit. We cover all journal papers that appear in a 10 year window and we look
at three such windows: 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999. The list of journal articles
includes all papers in conference proceedings, as well as short papers and notes. We do
not cover working papers and work published in books. The main reason for not covering
working papers is that this can potentially lead us into double counting. The main reason
for restricting attention to journal articles is that the EconLit database starts covering
books from the 1980's only and this would sharply restrict the time frame of our study.
Table 1 provides an overview of the coverage of our data. Tables 2 and 3 give us data
7on the number of EconLit journals and the number of articles published in these journals
over this period. The number of journals has grown from 196 in 1970 to 687 in 1999
while the number of journal articles in EconLit has grown from 62,569 in the 1970's to
156,454 in the 1990's. In Table 3 we can also see that the number of pages per article has
increased from 12.85 to 16.49 and that less and less papers have a single author. This
trend was highlighted in Ellison (2002a).
The coverage of the Econlit data set is clearly partial and, to check the robustness of our
¯ndings, we also consider an alternative set of data. We use the list of the Tinbergen
Institute Amsterdam-Rotterdam (hereafter TI list) to do this. This list of journals is
used by the Tinbergen Institute to assess the research output of faculty members at 3
Dutch Universities (University of Amsterdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Free
University Amsterdam). The Institute currently lists 133 journals in economics and re-
lated ¯elds (econometrics, accounting, marketing, and operations research), of which 113
are covered by EconLit in 2000. The appendix presents the list of these journals and
Table 2 shows the growth of this set over the 1970-2000 period. We observe that out of
the 113 journals in 2000, only 46 were covered by EconLit in 1970! While some of the
new journals are general interest journals, it is fair to say that most of the increase comes
from the expansion in the number of ¯eld journals. We interpret this as evidence of a
broadening as well as a deepening in the subject matter that is covered by economics.
Table 3 also shows summary statistics for the TI list data set. Not surprisingly we see
an increase in the number of papers, the number of pages per paper and the number of
coauthored papers.
We thus have six data sets: 3 for the set of all journals covered in EconLit and 3 for the
set of TI journals, and we construct a network for each data set. We ¯rst ¯nd the nodes
in the network by extracting the di®erent author names that appear in the data. As in
Newman (2001) we distinguish di®erent authors by their last name and the initials of all
their ¯rst names. Consequently, authors with the same last name and di®erent initials are
considered di®erent nodes. We note that a single author may sometimes be represented
by two nodes because of misspellings in the data or because of non-consistent use of
middle names. On the other hand, two di®erent authors might appear as one node in the
network if their surname and initials are identical.5 Further, for papers with more than
three authors EconLit reports only the ¯rst author and the extension et alia, and, hence,
the other authors are not known. We therefore exclude articles with four or more authors
from our network analysis. We then construct the whole co-authorship network by adding
links between those authors that have coauthored a paper. We note that we do not weight
the links, that is, we do not distinguish between more or less proli¯c relationships.6
5We also considered networks in which separate authors are distinguished by their last name and the
¯rst initial only. The conclusions are not a®ected by this extraction rule.
6We also analyzed weighted networks, see Newman (2001). Results are only slightly di®erent.
83.1 Aggregate patterns
We now discuss four aggregate statistics to examine the small world feature of the network,
namely: the order of the network, the existence and size of a giant component, the average
distance between the nodes in the giant component, and the clustering coe±cient.
Our analysis of the collaboration network starts with an examination of the order of the
network, i.e., the number of publishing economists. Table 4 tells us that the profession
has grown substantially in this period: the number of authors has grown from 33,770
in the 1970's to 81,217 in the 1990's. The data based on the TI list is consistent with
this trend: the number of authors has increased from 14,051 in the 1970's to 28,736 in
the 1990's. Our ¯rst ¯nding is therefore the following: the number of journal publishing
economists has grown substantially { more than doubling { over the period 1970 to 2000.
We next discuss the existence and size of the giant component. Table 4 tells us that in
the 1970's the largest component contained 5,253 nodes, which constituted about 15.6%
of the population. This largest component has expanded substantially over time and in
the 1990's it contains 33,027 nodes, which is roughly 40% of all nodes. Correspondingly,
there has been a sharp fall in the proportion of isolated nodes from almost 50% in the
1970's to about 30% in the 1990's. At the same time the second largest component has
also declined in size: it had 122 members in the 1970's and only 30 members in the 1990's.
This trend is consistent with evidence in the data on the TI list. These observations lead
to our next ¯nding: There has been a signi¯cant increase in the level of integration of
the network over the period 1970 to 2000. In particular, the giant component has grown
substantially; it covered 15% of the nodes in the 1970's and covers over 40% of the nodes
in the 1990's.
We now turn to the distance between the nodes in the network. As is the norm we set
the distance between nodes in the di®erent components to in¯nity and we use the average
distance between nodes in the giant component as a proxy for our measure of average
distance in the network. We ¯nd that this average distance has declined from 12.86 in
the 1970's to 9.47 in the 1990's. We also note that this fall in average distance has been
accompanied with a signi¯cant fall in the standard deviation in the distances between
nodes from 4.03 in the 1970's to 2.23 in the 1990's. This pattern is consistent with the
trends observed in the data on journals in the TI list. This leads to our next ¯nding: The
giant component has become signi¯cantly \smaller" in terms of distances.
We turn next to the level of overlap between co-authorship, which is measured by the
clustering coe±cient in the network. Table 4 shows that clustering coe±cient for the
network as a whole was .193 in the 1970's, .182 in the 1980's and .157 in the 1990's for
the network of all EconLit journal articles, and .188 in the 1970's, .180 in the 1980's and
.167 in the 1990's when we consider articles in TI list journals only. These clustering
levels are very high. To make this concrete, let us consider the ¯gures from the 1990's.
There are 81,217 authors and on average a person has 1.672 co-authors; we can interpret
9this as saying that the probability of a link being formed is approximately .000025. In
a random graph, since the probability of link formation is independent, the clustering
coe±cient should be approximately equal to this probability of a link. However, the
actual clustering coe±cient is given by .157, which is more than 6,000 times the level
predicted by the random model of link generation. These observations lead us to our next
¯nding: the clustering coe±cient for the network is very high throughout the period under
study.7
When we set these ¯ndings against the criteria for a network to display small world prop-
erties, we ¯nd that throughout the period 1970-2000 the collaboration networks satisfy
(1), (3) and (4), i.e. the average degree of the networks under consideration is tiny relative
to the number of nodes,8 clustering is high, and distance within the giant component is
small. As to criterion 2, we note that the coverage of the giant component was relatively
modest in the 1970's but in the 1990's it covered over 40% of the nodes. That is, a giant
component has emerged and thus in the 1990's the collaboration network satis¯es all four
criteria. Furthermore, we see a decline of average distances within the giant component.
This leads us to conclude that economics is an emerging small world.
3.2 Micro-level statistics
What is it about the number and arrangement of links in the network that generates these
aggregate features. Our approach to this question is founded on the idea that individual
economists have a choice between writing papers by themselves or in collaboration with
others, and that the network of collaboration we observe arises out of the decisions they
make in this regard. Thus the crucial micro level data in this approach are the number of
collaboration links that an individual forms and the patterns of linking across economists.
We start with the behavior of the average number of links. In all the data we have assem-
bled we observe the following: the average degree of the networks is very low but it has
grown signi¯cantly in the period 1970 to 2000. For the set of all journals in EconLit, Ta-
ble 4 tells us that there is almost a doubling in the per capita number of links/collaborators
from .894 in the 1970's to 1.672 in the 1990's. This ¯gure covers all publishing economists
and it is useful to also examine the per capita number of collaborators among people who
are in the giant component. Table 4 shows us that the per capita number of collaborators
increased from 2.48 in the 1970's to 3.06 in the 1990's. This trend is also visible and
clear cut in the TI list of Journals. This yields us our ¯rst ¯nding on the micro statistics
of the network: the number of collaborators has been increasing consistently through the
1970-2000.
7Papers with three co-authors increase the clustering coe±cient. However, when we compute the
clustering coe±cient only considering papers with two co-authors, we ¯nd that the clustering coe±cient
is around .015, still more than 600 times the level predicted by a random link model.
8For instance, from Table 4 we see that in the 1990's the average degree was 1.68 while the number
of publishing economists was well over 80,000.
10We now turn to the distribution of the degree across nodes. We start by noting that the
Pareto plot of the degree distribution appears to converge to a straight line for high degree
k. This suggests that at high quantiles the distribution converges to a Pareto or power-
law distribution.9 An important characteristic of such a distribution is the existence of
a fat tail. Indeed, extreme degree values appear more frequently in the real data than
in a binomial distribution ¯tted on the 1990's data set. While under the ¯tted binomial
distribution it is unlikely that any author has more than 10 links, in reality we see that
more than 1% of the authors have more than 10 links and some of them have 40 to 50
links. We explore the inequality in the degree distribution further by looking at the Lorenz
curves. Figure 2 suggests that the 20% most-linked authors account for about 60% of all
the links.10 These observations lead us to the following ¯nding: The distribution of links
in the population of economists is very unequal and exhibits a fat tail.
We now examine more closely the link pattern of the individuals who have very large
degree in the network of collaboration. Table 5 tells us that in the 1970's the maximally
connected person had 25 links and the 100 most linked persons had 12 links on average.
Looking more closely at the most connected individual we see three very striking features:
one, this person published 44 papers out of which 42 (i.e. 95% of them) were co-authored;
two, he had 25 collaborators while the average number of collaborations per capita was
less than 1; and three, the clustering coe±cient for this person was only .05, which is much
smaller than .193, the clustering coe±cient of the network at large. Similarly, in the 1990's
the most connected individual published 66 papers, of which 64 were co-authored (i.e. 97%
of the total), had 54 collaborators (while the per capita number of collaborators was under
2) and a clustering coe±cient of .02 (while the clustering coe±cient of the network as a
whole was .157). Thus the most connected individuals collaborated extensively and most
of their co-authors did not collaborate with each other. These individuals can be viewed
as `stars' from the perspective of the network architecture. A closer inspection of Table 5
reveals that these three patterns are quite general and hold for the average of the 100
most linked individuals in the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's. This leads us to state: There is
a large number of `stars' in the world of economics.
We next examine the role of the stars in connecting di®erent parts of the network. For
this purpose we compared the consequences of randomly deleting 2% or 5% of the nodes
on network connectivity and clustering with the consequences of deleting star nodes. We
did this for the network based on all EconLit journals. Table 6 shows the results. We can
see that a removal of 5% of the authors at random has almost no e®ect on the network
connectivity and clustering. For the 1990's, we ¯nd that the size of the giant component
goes down from .407 to .389, while the average distance within the giant component
9A power-law distribution would take the form f(k) = ®k¡¯, with ® > 0 and ¯ > 0.
10From Figure 2 it appears that inequality has substantially diminished. However, this observation is
somewhat misleading since it appears to stem from a decrease in the number of isolated authors. If we
considered non-isolated authors only, we would observe a marginal increase in equality. In our working
paper version we provide Gini coe±cients to quantify inequality in the distribution of links.
11increases marginally from 9.47 to 9.68. By contrast, a removal of the 5% most connected
nodes has a devastating e®ect on the network. The giant component breaks down almost
completely. Moreover, the impact on clustering is very substantial: it increases from 0.157
to .344. This suggests that stars play the role of connectors and sharply reduce distance
between di®erent highly clustered parts of the world of economics. We therefore conclude
that the economics world is spanned by a collection of inter-linked stars.
We would like to plot the networks for the periods of 1970's, 1980's and 1990's to get
an overall picture of the networks. This has proven to be very di±cult due to the large
numbers of nodes involved. We have therefore tried to plot the local network around
some prominent well connected economists (Figures 3-4). These plots are fascinating and
suggest a number of ideas; we would like to draw attention in particular to one striking
feature of the networks: hierarchy. For instance, in the plot for Joseph Stiglitz (Figure 3)
we ¯nd that he is linked to several persons who are themselves `stars' in the sense discussed
above. Furthermore, we observe that these star co-authors of Mr. Stiglitz typically do
not work with each other and also that the co-authors of these persons typically do not
work with each other, nor they do work with Mr. Stiglitz. Thus there seems to be a
hierarchy of well connected persons. We ¯nd this structure remarkable as this hierarchy
is mostly self-organizing. A similar structure can be observed in the plot for Jean Tirole
(see Figure 4).
The discussion on micro-variables allows us to make two general points. The ¯rst point is
about a stable feature of the network: inter-linked stars span the network of collaboration
throughout the period under study. The second point is about an important change: there
has been a signi¯cant increase in the average degree of the network.
3.3 Explaining the emerging small world
There are two principal macro level changes in the structure of the economics network from
which we conclude that a small world is emerging: one, the giant component is growing,
and two, average distance within the expanding giant component is falling. Further,
we observe one principal micro level change, namely, the average degree is increasing.
We would like to examine the relative importance of this increase in average degree in
explaining the macro level changes.
We ¯rst point out that one would expect the increase in average degree to be related to the
changes in the macro level variables. A higher average degree means that there are more
links in the network, and these extra links bring economists together. These economists
would otherwise not be connected, or only indirectly connected. Thus, everything else
constant, a higher average degree increases the size of the giant component and decreases
the average distance within the giant component.11
11In a uniformly random graph the expected size of the giant component increases with average degree.
Further, in a uniformly random graph average distance converges to lnn=ln´ for large n whenever ´ > 1
(see, e.g., Albert and Barab¶ asi, 2002).
12In the literature, however, other explanations have been given for the emergence of a small
world. The explanation which is most often heard is that the decrease in communication
and travelling costs has made collaboration across individuals in di®erent departments
and countries easier (see Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004). There is plenty of empirical evi-
dence showing that there has been a substantial increase in 'distant' collaborations in the
last years. For example, Hamermesh and Oster (2002) ¯nd that in the 1970's only 5.6% of
the collaborations were between authors working at di®erent departments throughout the
duration of the project. This number increased to 20.3% between 1992 and 1996. There-
fore, economists have substituted collaboration projects with colleagues from the same
department for projects with collaborators from 'distant' departments. This 'rewiring' of
links should in principle make the world smaller (see Watts and Strogatz, 1998). That
is, the giant component should grow and distances within the giant component should
shrink when there are more 'distant' links.12
We would like to compare the importance of the change in average degree on change
in the macro level variables, relative to the importance of other e®ects as the increase in
distant collaboration. Here we would like to take into account that the size of the network
has increased dramatically, and this tends to increase distances.13 For this purpose we
carry out the following simulation experiment.14 Starting with the 3 networks based on
all articles in EconLit, we ¯rst randomly delete nodes from the networks of the 1980's
and the 1990's until the size of these networks is equal to the size of the network in the
1970's (i.e. 33,770 individuals). Next, we randomly delete links from all three networks
until they all have the same degree of .67. This procedure controls for the changes in
the size and in the degree of the network, while preserves other changes, as changes in
the degree distribution or in the arrangement of links. In particular, the proportion of
distant links in the networks is not altered by this procedure. The procedure makes a
draw from three random networks, random in the sense that every draw of this procedure
creates a di®erent network with di®erent macro outcomes. Formally, denote Gt(Nt;gt) as
the coauthorship network in decade t. Then the above procedure draws from a random
network Gt(m;z), assigning positive probability to any network G(N;g) where N ½ Nt,
g ½ gt, jNj = m and ´(G(N;g)) = z, and zero probability to any other network.
Since we control for the changes in size and degree, we can formulate the following hy-
potheses. If the increase in degree were the only relevant factor leading to the emergence
of a small world, we would expect that the networks adjusted by the above procedure are
very similar and that their macro level properties are basically the same. Alternatively,
if other factors such as the rearrangement of links (rewiring) did matter, then we would
12In the model of Rosenblat and Mobius (2004), despite the fact that this substitution e®ect increases
group separation, average distance decreases.
13In a uniformly random network, average distance converges to lnn=ln´ for large n, see e.g. Albert
and Barab¶ asi (2002). Hence, in a random network a larger network results in larger distances.
14We could regress the macro level variables on network size, average degree and the fraction of distant
links; however, this procedure is not feasible since we only have 6 networks observed.
13expect to observe an increase in the size of the giant component and a decrease in av-
erage distances as we move from the 1970's to the 1990's adjusted networks. Denoting
~ ngc;t ´ Efngc(Gt(33770;:67))g, and ~ dt ´ Efd(Gt(33770;:67))g, we thus consider the four
following hypotheses:
1) H0 : ~ ngc;19800s = ~ ngc;19700s against H1 : ~ ngc;19800s > ~ ngc;19700s
2) H0 : ~ ngc;19900s = ~ ngc;19800s against H1 : ~ ngc;19900s > ~ ngc;19800s
3) H0 : ~ d19800s = ~ d19700s against H1 : ~ d19800s < ~ d19700s
4) H0 : ~ d19900s = ~ d19800s against H1 : ~ d19900s < ~ d19800s
To test the hypotheses we repeat the procedure 200 times and create a sample of 200
observations from the random networks of the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's, and for each
network in the sample we compute the relevant statistics. Table 7 shows the means and
the standard deviations of the main macro statistics based on this sample (note that the
size and the average degree are ¯xed). Our ¯rst observation is that, on average, the giant
component comprised 9.0% of the population in the 1970's adjusted network, 11.0% in
the 1980's adjusted network, and 11.6% in the 1990's adjusted network. Hence, the size
of the giant component slightly increases. This is also con¯rmed by the test statistics in
Table 8. The giant component is (signi¯cantly) larger in the 1980's than in the 1970's
with a t-statistic of 53.8, and similarly the giant component is (signi¯cantly) larger in the
1990's compared to the 1980's.15 We note, however, that this increase in the size of the
giant component is of much smaller magnitude than the increase in the size of the giant
component in the actual network: as reported in Table 4, the giant component in the
actual networks increased from 15% in the 1970's to 40% in the 1990's!
Our second observation is that the mean distance is, on average, 14.50 in the 1970's
adjusted network, 15.47 in the 1980's adjusted network, and 15.47 in the 1990's adjusted
network. Hence, after controlling for size and degree, we see an increase in average
distance from the 1970's to the 1980's and stable distances from the 1980's to the 1990's!
Not surprisingly, the tests in Table 8 con¯rm that the hypothesis of nondecreasing distance
cannot be rejected.
We also performed a similar experiment on the TI list data set. The results are also
reported in Tables 7 and 8. These results are very similar to the results based on all
articles. These observations imply that changes in the patterns of links only partially
account for the growth of the giant component and it cannot account for the fall in average
distances within the giant component. Our experiment thus leads to the conclusion that
the increase in average degree is the driving force behind the emergence of a small world.
In a recent paper, Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) argue that it is the change in patterns of
links that explains the fall in average distances. Our ¯nding contradicts this argument. We
15Since ~ ggc;t and ~ dt are not normally distributed, we also perform non-parametric Wilcoxon (Mann-
Whitney) tests to test for equal median.
14shortly examine the approach used by them to understand the reasons for the con°icting
conclusions. Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) look at a network of collaboration of authors
who published in 8 core economics journals. They compare the collaboration network
of 1975-1989 to the network of 1985-1999 and the network of 1970-1989 to the network
of 1980-1999. They consider the giant component only, and they observe that average
degree in the giant component has increased from 2.52 to 2.72 across the two networks.
They control for this change in average degree by deleting links according to the ratio
1 ¡ C1=C2, where C1 is the average degree in the giant component between 1975-1989
and C2 is the average degree in the giant component between 1985-1999. They ¯nd that
average distances are lower in the giant component of the adjusted 1985-1999 network as
compared to the actual 1975-1989 network. This leads them to argue that it is the change
in the pattern of links that has led to a fall in average distances in the giant component
(see Table 6 in their paper).
We note that the procedure of Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) does not correct for the
increase in the number of nodes. Further, only a small fraction of the links are removed
(at most 11% of the links). Furthermore, they only focus on the giant component of
the network, ignoring smaller components of the network. In our procedure, by contrast,
we remove a considerable fraction of all nodes and links. One reason for this di®erent
approach is a di®erence in scope of the paper. While Rosenblat and Mobius take the giant
component as given, the emergence of a giant component is one of our main ¯ndings, and
we observe it in all the networks analyzed.16 We therefore believe that one cannot treat
the size of the giant component as given, and one should aim at controlling both for the
size and the degree of the whole network. Secondly, a closer look at their table reveals that
their procedure does not correct the increase in average degree within the giant component
fully. That is, even in the adjusted 1985-1999 network the average degree is higher (2.58)
than in the actual 1975-1989 network (2.52). The reason for this discrepancy is that, as
links are deleted at random, nodes with few links will drop out of the giant component
earlier, leaving nodes with a higher degree in the giant component. On the other hand,
Table 7 shows that our procedure, deleting nodes and links in the whole network, results
in an average degree in the giant component that hardly changes.17
3.4 Data robustness
We now brie°y discuss some aspects of the data that we use. A shortcoming of the above
data for our purposes is the partial coverage of the EconLit list. We observe that this
list has been growing over time and the data discussed above relate to this expanding
world. This pattern creates the following possibility: in the 1970's the world of journals
16We analyzed a data set similar to that used by Rosenblat and Mobius (2004). We found that fractional
size of the giant component in this data set increased from 20% in 1975-1989 to 30% in 1985-1999.
17We applied our procedure and the procedure of Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) to a dataset similar
to that in their paper. We found that, using our procedure, there is no evidence that average distance
decreases. The results are available on request.
15was actually very similar to the one we observe today but the EconLit data set does not
capture this as it covered a small subset of journals and therefore excluded a large part
of the journal publishing world. If this were true then the data above would be about
the world of EconLit authors but would not be a good indicator of the world of journal
publishing economists per se.
To get around this problem, we carry out two related robustness checks. We study the
network of collaboration using only the subset of journals that appear in EconLit for the
entire sample period. This is the route taken in Table 9. The number of authors has gone
up signi¯cantly from 22,960 in the 1970's to 32,773 in the 1990's, about 43%. We now
turn to the statistics on the pattern of connections. We note that the largest component
has grown from 3,076 nodes in the 1970's, which was about 13% of all nodes, to 10,054
nodes in the 1990's, which is about 30% of all nodes. Likewise, the percentage of isolated
authors has fallen from about 50% in the 1970's to about 32% in the 1990's. Thus the
order of the network is increasing while the network is becoming more integrated. We
note however that there is no trend in average distances in the giant component in the
period under consideration. With regard to the micro statistics, Table 9 tells us that
mean number of links per author has increased from 0.885 in the 1970's to 1.386 in the
1990's.
We ¯nally consider a ¯xed set of ¯ve core journals, namely, American Economic Review,
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Review
of Economic Studies. Table 9 show the results we obtain. The size of the giant component
has increased from 7% in the 1970's to 25% in the 1990's. Further, the number of per
capita collaborators has increased from .833 in the 1970's to 1.429 in the 1990's and the
clustering coe±cient has remained high over time. There is no trend is average distance
however.
The observations lead us to conclude that there is a signi¯cant increase in the size of the
giant component as well as in the average degree of the network. This is consistent with
our earlier observations. Further, geodesic distances are small, but average distance does
not show a declining trend. This is in contrast with our earlier observations. However,
the results are in line with the analysis of the adjusted networks in which we control the
networks for the increase in order and degree. We conclude that the growth of the giant
component is a robust feature of the collaboration networks, while declining distances are
not.
4 An incentives based explanation
In this section we develop a simple model of network formation to explain the observed
empirical patterns, speci¯cally, the existence of inter-linked stars and the growth in the
16giant component. Our model has three main aspects: a technology of knowledge produc-
tion, productivity di®erences across individuals, and academic reward schemes.18
We suppose that there are n players and that a player can be either of High type or Low
type. There are nh High-type players, and nl Low-type players, and n = nh + nl. We
assume that 1 < nh << nl and that nl is su±ciently large. We denote the set of players
by N. Players make decisions on their research strategy: whether to write alone or with
others, and if with others, how many co-authorships to form and with which types of
players; they also decide how many papers to write and how much e®ort to put in each
paper that they write.
A paper x is either single-authored or it has two authors. Let gx
ij 2 f0;1g model i's
decision on whether to participate in a project x with author j; where a value of 1 signi¯es
participation while a value of 0 signi¯es non-participation. Let ex
ii denote the e®ort that
player i spends on a single-authored paper x, and let ex
ij, refer to the time that he spends
on a joint paper x with coauthor j. We assume that for a paper to be written the total
e®ort put in by its authors must be at least 1. A research strategy of a player is then
given by a row vector, si = f(gx
ij;ex
ij)x2f1;::;mg;j2Ng, where m is the number of projects that
a player participates in either individually or with any other single coauthor. A player j
is a coauthor of player i if gx
ij = gx
ji = 1 for some paper x. Let ´i(s) be the number of
coauthors of player i in research strategy s.
A paper consists of ideas and routine/technical work.19 The quality of a paper depends
only on the quality of the ideas it contains and the ideas of the paper in turn depend on
the type of the authors of the paper. A High-type author has high quality ideas, while a
Low-type author has low quality ideas; the high and low quality types of ideas are denoted
by th and tl, respectively, where th > tl > 1. It is natural to assume that a type i author
will write single-authored papers of quality ti only, i = h;l; we assume that if two authors
i and j jointly work on a paper the quality of the paper is given by ti ¢ tj. Thus quality
of a paper can be q 2 ft2
h;thtl;th;t2
l;tlg = Q.20
We assume that the marginal costs of writing papers increase with the number of pa-
pers, re°ecting increasing marginal opportunity costs of time. Maintaining a coauthor
relationship involves communication and coordination across di®erent projects and pos-
sibly di®erent partners and these costs are likely to increase as the number of co-authors
18For a related model of co-authors, see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Their interest is in comple-
mentarities in collaboration and their equilibrium networks are characterized by complete components of
di®erent sizes.
19This is similar to the formulation used in Ellison (2002b).
20In economics, quality of original ideas appears to be the crucial variable and physical capital and
infrastructure seems to play a relatively minor role in the production of knowledge. This is quite di®erent
from the situation in subjects such as medicine and physics, where experiments require very substantial
infrastructure and the provider of these resources is very critical role. Our formulation is therefore better
suited for the study of collaboration in economics.
17increases. This leads us to assume that the marginal cost are increasing in the number
of coauthors, ´i(s). Given these considerations, we are able to write down the costs of a


















with f > 0. This ¯rst part of the cost speci¯cation captures the idea that a collaboration
relation between two individuals i and j is a research project and that the costs of coming
up with interesting ideas and papers increase as more papers are written within the
project. This leads us to suppose that writing m papers with m di®erent coauthors is less
costly than writing m papers with a single coauthor. This assumption pushes individuals
toward diversi¯cation of collaborators. On the other hand, our assumption that costs of
linking with others are convex in the number of links pushes toward fewer collaborators.
The optimal number of collaborators trades o® these two pressures.
We shall suppose that a person is rewarded on the basis of quality weighted index of
papers he publishes, there is discounting of joint work and that there is a minimum
quality requirement such that only papers above this quality are accepted for publication.
We shall suppose that this threshold is given by ¹ q where ¹ q 2 [1;t2
h]. One interpretation
of this threshold is in terms of di®erent journals: a higher ranked journal can be more
selective in the papers it publishes and so it will have a higher threshold as compared to
a lower ranked journal. We suppose that a single-author paper of quality q gets a reward
q, while a 2-author paper of quality q yields a reward rq to each author, where r 2 [0;1]
re°ects the discounting for joint work in the market.21
For a strategy pro¯le s, let Ix
ij(e) be an indicator function, which takes on value 1 if
gx
ij = gx
ji = 1, ex
ij + ex
ji ¸ 1, and qx
ij ¸ ¹ q, and it takes a value of 0, otherwise. Given these
considerations, for a strategy si and faced with a strategy pro¯le s¡i, the payo®s to a



































We study the architecture of networks that are strategically stable. Our notion of strategic




to be a Nash equilibrium if ¦i(s¤
i;s¤
¡i) ¸ ¦i(si;s¤
¡i), for all si 2 Si, and for all i 2 N.
In our model a coauthoring decision requires that both players wish to participate in the
paper. It is then easy to see that an autarchic situation in which no one does any joint
21We are assuming here that di®erent types involved in a collaboration get the same reward; our results
do not change qualitatively if we assume that Low types get a lower payo® than High types.
18work is always a Nash equilibrium. To avoid these types of coordination problems we
supplement the idea of Nash equilibrium with the requirement of pair-wise stability. We
de¯ne pair-wise stable equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition 1 A strategy pro¯le s¤ is a pair-wise stable equilibrium if the following con-
ditions hold:
1. s¤ constitutes a Nash equilibrium.




















We shall use the short form { pws-equilibrium { to refer to pair-wise stable equilibrium.
This notion of equilibrium is taken from Goyal and Joshi (2003); it generalizes the original
formulation of pair-wise stability due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) by allowing pairs of
players to form and delete links simultaneously. We shall say that a network is symmetric
if all equal-type players have the same number of links with each of the two types of
players. This will allow us to talk of the number of collaborations between a typical i and
j type of players and use ´ij to refer to this number.
We ¯rst characterize equilibrium networks under the assumption that, in a joint project,
each author contributes one half of the time needed for routine work and gets credit r for
the joint paper. This may be interpreted as a model with no transfers. We note that the
optimal choice of number of papers is independent across pairwise collaboration ties. This
is due to the cost speci¯cation which is additive across projects with di®erent co-authors
and own projects. Our ¯rst result derives the optimal number of papers that High type
and Low type authors will write on their own and with others.22
Proposition 1 Suppose ¹ q < tl. A High type player optimally chooses m¤
h = th=2c single
author papers, m¤
hh = 2rt2
h=c papers in a HH collaboration, and m¤
hl = 2rthtl=c papers in
HL collaboration. A Low type player optimally chooses m¤
l = tl=2c single author papers,
m¤
lh = 2rthtl=c papers in a LH collaboration, and m¤
ll = 2rt2
l=c papers in LL collaboration.






22In what follows we treat the number of papers and the number of co-authors as continuous variables.
19Straightforward calculations yield m¤
h = th=2c. Similarly, for a High type the optimal











This optimization problem yields us the solution that m¤
hh = 2rt2
h=c. Similarly, the optimal
number if papers for a H type in a HL collaboration are given by m¤
hl = 2rthtl=c. Given
that the publication threshold is below tl, L types will also write papers on their own.
The computations for these players are similar and omitted. ¥
This proposition tells us that H-types will write more single authored paper than L-
types. Moreover, the optimal number of papers in a HH relationship is greater than the
number of papers in a LL co-author relation. These results follow directly from the initial
quality di®erences across players. We also note that the number of optimal papers varies
negatively with the costs of writing papers, while they vary positively with the individual
credit given in co-authored papers.
Let ¼i refer to the payo® that a i type player gets from working alone, and ¼ij refer to
the reward that a type i player gets from working with a type j player. Then the above









































In what follows, our interest is primarily in the nature of co-author networks that arise and
we shall omit mention of single author papers throughout the discussion. The following
result characterizes equilibrium networks.
Proposition 2 Suppose that nh ¡ 1 ¸ r2t4
h=cf, ¹ q = tl and nh and nl are even numbers.
A symmetric equilibrium network exists and it has the following properties.
1. If f > 2r2t4
h=c then it is empty.
2. If 2r2t4






lh = 0 and ´¤
ll = 0.











Proof: We ¯rst characterize the incentives to collaborate. Part (1) follows directly from
noting that ¼¤
hh < f=2 implies that there is no incentive for two H-types to collaborate.
Since this is the highest possible return from co-authorship no links can arise in equilib-
rium. We now prove part (2). First, we note that since ¼¤
hh > ¼¤
hl an H-type will not
link up with an L-type if there is an H-type available. The assumptions nh ¡1 ¸ r2t4
h=cf
20and nh is an even number guarantee that this will be the case (the critical number of
high types is derived below). Second, we note that an L type would only be willing to
collaborate with L-types if f=2 < ¼¤
ll.
We now turn to optimal choice of partners. If f=2 < ¼¤
hh then the optimal number of














cf . Thus if nh ¡1 >
r2t4
h
cf , then there are enough H-types
around and an H-type will not collaborate with an L-type. The computations for L-type
players in case (3) are similar and omitted.
The existence of symmetric equilibrium follows directly from the fact that an optimal
number of papers and co-authors exist, nh and nl are even and large enough to make
optimal linking feasible. ¥
Proposition 2 tells us that if two persons involved in a collaboration equally share the
e®ort required to write a paper, then only links between same type players will form in
a symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, H-types will have more co-authors than L-types.
Figure 5 presents the equilibrium networks; in this ¯gure fhh = 2r2t4
h=c and fll = 2r2t4
l=c.
We now comment on the role of the two institutional reward variables: the threshold level
for publication, ¹ q, and the credit for joint work r. The threshold ¹ q is critical in de¯ning
the level and types of co-authorship. This leads us to ask: does an increase in ¹ q always
raise the proportion of co-authored papers? The answer to this depends on the relative
value of th and tl. If th < t2
l then the proportion of co-authored papers is increasing in ¹ q.
If th > t2
l then there is a non-monotonicity: as ¹ q crosses tl the proportion increases and
as it increases beyond t2
l it falls before rising again to a value of 1 as ¹ q crosses th. We also
note that the number of joint papers as well as the number of co-authors is increasing in
r, the level of individual credit for co-authored work.
Proposition 2 implies that there are no connections between Low and High type players.
Moreover, in equilibrium, links only exist between players with the same number of links.
This seems to be at variance with one of the crucial aspects of empirically observed
networks: the existence of a large number of stars (which arise when highly connected
players connect with very poorly connected players, see Table 8). This di®erence between
observed patterns and equilibrium predictions leads us to explore two aspects of the model
more closely: the number of H-types available and the possibility of transfers between High
and Low types.
One reason for the `same-type collaboration only' result is that there are enough players
of each type. What happens if an H-type wants to collaborate with 10 H-types but there
21are only 5 H-types around? In this case, High type players may be induced to collaborate
with L-type players. This observation leads us to the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that nh¡1 < r2t4
h=cf and the threshold for publication is ¹ q = tl.
Then a symmetric equilibrium has the following features.
1. If f > 2r2t4
h=c then it is empty.
2. If 2r2t4
l=c < f < 2r2t4





cf ¡nh+1g L-type co-authors. L-types do not work with each other.
3. If f < 2r2t4
l=c an H-type has exactly the same co-author pattern as in (2), while each
L-type has ´lh 2 (1;nh) H-type co-authors and maxf0;
r2t4
l
cf ¡´lhg L-type co-authors.
Proof: Part 1 follows as in Proposition 2. We now prove part 2. Since nh¡1 < r2t4
h=cf =
n¤
hh, it follows that there are not enough High-type players around so that a High-type
may ¯nd it worthwhile to form collaborations with Low-types. Since ¼¤
lh > ¼¤
ll a Low-type
always prefers to collaborate with a High-type rather than with another Low-type. Thus,











(nh ¡ 1 + ´hl)2
2
: (8)
It is now easy to see that the optimal number of HL collaborations is given by ´hl =
r2t2
ht2
l=cf ¡ nh + 1. We now consider the incentives of L types. First note that since
f > 2r2t4
l=c there will be no LL co-authored papers. It then follows that an L-type player
will have ´lh 2 f1;nhg H-type co-authors in a symmetric equilibrium. This completes the
proof of part 2. The proof of part 3 is similar and omitted. ¥
A scarcity of H-types implies that there is a wide range of parameters for which HL
collaborations arise in equilibrium. Moreover, since nh << nl, in part (2) equilibrium
networks will have an inter-linked stars structure: all H types will co-author with each
other while each of them will co-author with a number of L-types, who do not co-author
with each other. Figure 6 presents equilibrium networks when the number of H types is
small; in this ¯gure fhh and fll are de¯ned as before, while fhl = r2t2
ht2
l=(nh ¡ 1)c
We now examine the scope of `a sharing of scarce resources' motivation for collaboration
between an H-type and an L-type. We start by examining a case in which L-types o®er
`time' for routine work and in return get High quality ideas from H-types. An important
issue here is how the exchange of ideas and time takes place. We ¯rst discuss the case where
an L-type only shares in the routine work and does not share the costs of maintaining
links f. In this case it is possible to show that there will be no collaboration between
H-types and L-types. The intuition here is as follows: when two H-types collaborate the
surplus generated (at the optimal level of projects m¤
hh) is much higher as compared to
22the surplus generated when an H-type and an L-type collaborate. To induce an H-type to
collaborate with an L-type the share for the H-type must therefore be much higher. This
however reduces the share of the L-type and leads to lower number of projects undertaken
which in turn renders an HL collaboration less attractive than a fair HH collaboration for
a H-type player.23
This argument leads us to ask: are there other richer transfer schemes which would allow
mutually pro¯table HL collaboration? An obvious candidate is an arrangement by which
an L type does all the routine work and also bears the costs of maintaining the relation.
In that extreme case, an H type incurs no costs in writing papers with an L-type, while
a L-type has to compare the relative returns of entering into such an unequal relation as
compared to working on equal terms with another L-type. Suppose the L-type contributes
all the time needed for the routine work. Then the payo®s to an L-type from such an HL
relation are: ¼lh = r2t2
ht2
l=4c. On the other hand, the payo®s to an L-type from an LL
relation are ¼¤
ll = r2t4
l=c. Now it is easy to see that if th > 2tl, then an L-type would prefer
to link with an H type rather than link with another L type. Moreover, since the H-type
bears no costs, clearly he is happy to enter into such a collaboration. This collaboration
relation corresponds to a simple trade: an H-type player o®ers ideas in return for which
the L-type collaborator o®ers time and resources for routine work. This collaboration
relation leads to a network in which every H-type has ´¤
hh HH-collaborations and possibly
a very large number of HL-collaborations. Moreover, each of the L-type partner has
relatively very few HL-collaborations and a few LL-collaborations (assuming ¹ q < t2
l.)
This is consistent with an inter-linked stars architecture as depicted in Figure 6.
5 Concluding remarks
The structures of social interaction a®ect individual behavior and economic performance
in important ways. This leads us to ask: does the architecture of social interaction exhibit
particular patterns and are these patterns stable over time?
We examine the evolution of interaction among economists by looking at co-authorship
relations over a thirty year period. We ¯nd that in the 1970's this world was quite
fragmented with the largest set of inter-connected individuals { the giant component
{ covering only 15% of the population, while in the 1990's this world was much more
integrated, with the giant component covering close to half the population. At the same
time, the distance between individuals on the giant component fell signi¯cantly, leading
us to conclude that economics is an an emerging `small world'.
We then ask: what is it about the number and distribution of co-authorships that accounts
for these aggregate patterns? We have two principal ¯ndings here. Our ¯rst ¯nding is that
23A formal proof of this is available in the working paper version of the paper.
23the distribution of links is very unequal (fat tails are present) and there are many stars
(these are highly connected economists who work with economists who have few or no
other co-authors). Thus the world of economists is spanned by a set of inter-linked stars.
Our second ¯nding is that changes in average degree are the main factor underlying the
growth in the giant component and the fall in distances in the expanding giant component.
We propose a simple model of production of knowledge in economics with the feature
that a paper consists of novel ideas and routine work. The quality of the paper depends
on the quality of ideas. We embed this basic technology in a setting where individuals
are di®erentiated by the quality of ideas they have. Every individual chooses how many
papers to write, and also with whom to write them. We ¯nd that an unequal distribution
of collaborations and inter-linked stars arise naturally in this environment. Falling costs
of communication and higher individual credit for co-authored work both lead to greater
co-authoring and this is consistent with a growth in the giant component.
Our paper identi¯es certain stable features of collaboration networks in economics as
well as provides an explanation for the emerging smallness of this academic world. We
argue that there are good incentive based reasons to expect such architectures to arise
in academic environments. These ¯ndings raise the question: Is the inter-linked stars
structure of economics conducive for the generation and spread of knowledge?
24Appendix: Tinbergen Institute List of Journals
Journals (AA): 1. American Economic Review 2. Econometrica 3. Journal of Political
Economy 4. Quarterly Journal of Economics 5. Review of Economic Studies
Journals (A): 1. Accounting Review 2. Econometric Theory 3. Economic Journal 4.
European Economic Review 5. Games and Economic Behavior 6. International Economic
Review 7. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8. Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics 9. Journal of Econometrics 10. Journal of Economic Literature 11. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 12. Journal of Economic Theory 13. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 14. Journal of Finance 15. Journal of Financial Economics
16. Journal of Health Economics 17. Journal of Human Resources 18. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 19. Journal of Labor Economics 20. Journal of Marketing Research
21. Journal of Monetary Economics 22. Journal of Public Economics 23. Management
Science(*) 24. Mathematics of Operations Research (*) 25. Operations Research (*) 26.
Rand Journal of Economics / Bell Journal of Economics 27. Review of Economics and
Statistics 28. Review of Financial Studies 29. World Bank Economic Review.
Journals (B): 1. Accounting and Business Research(*) 2. Accounting, Organizations
and Society(*) 3. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 4. Applied Economics 5.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 6. Canadian Journal of Economics 7. Contemporary
Accounting Research(*) 8. Contemporary Economic Policy 9. Ecological Economics 10.
Economic Development and Cultural Change 11. Economic Geography 12. Economic
History Review 13. Economic Inquiry / Western Economic Journal 14. Economics Let-
ters 15. Economic Policy 16. Economic Record 17. Economic Theory 18. Economica 19.
Economics and Philosophy 20. Economist 21. Energy Economics 22. Environment and
Planning A 23. Environmental and Resource Economics 24. European Journal of Opera-
tional Research(*) 25. Europe-Asia Studies(*) 26. Explorations in Economic History 27.
Financial Management 28. Health Economics 29. Industrial and Labor Relations Review
30. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 31. Interfaces(*) 32. International Journal
of Forecasting 33. International Journal of Game Theory 34. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 35. International Journal of Research in Marketing(*) 36. Inter-
national Monetary Fund Sta® Papers 37. International Review of Law and Economics 38.
International Tax and Public Finance 39. Journal of Accounting Literature(*) 40. Jour-
nal of Accounting Research 41. Journal of Applied Econometrics 42. Journal of Applied
Economics 43. Journal of Banking and Finance 44. Journal of Business 45. Journal of
Comparative Economics 46. Journal of Development Economics 47. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 48. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 49. Journal of
Economic History 50. Journal of Economic Issues 51. Journal of Economic Psychology 52.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 53. Journal of Evolutionary Economics
54. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55. Journal of Financial Interme-
diation 56. Journal of Forecasting 57. Journal of Industrial Economics 58. Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics / Zeitschrift fÄ ur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
2559. Journal of International Money and Finance 60. Journal of Law and Economics 61.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 62. Journal of Macroeconomics 63. Journal
of Mathematical Economics 64. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 65. Journal of
Population Economics 66. Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 67. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty 68. Journal of the Operations Research Society(*) 69. Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy 70. Journal of Urban Economics 71. Kyklos 72. Land Economics
73. Macroeconomic Dynamics 74. Marketing Science 75. Mathematical Finance 76. Na-
tional Tax Journal 77. Operations Research Letters(*) 78. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes(*) 79. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics / Bulletin
of the Institute of Economics and Statistics 80. Oxford Economic Papers 81. Oxford Re-
view of Economic Policy 82. Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences(*)
83. Public Choice 84. Queuing Systems(*) 85. Regional Science and Urban Economics
86 Reliability Engineering & System Safety(*) 87. Resource and Energy Economics /
Resource and Energy 88. Review of Income and Wealth 89. Scandanavian Journal of
Economics / Swedish Journal of Economics 90. Scottish Journal of Political Economy
91. Small Business Economics 92. Social Choice and Welfare 93. Southern Economic
Journal 94. Theory and Decision 95. Transportation Research B - Methodological 96.
Transportation Science(*) 97. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv / Review of World Economics
98. World Development 99. World Economy
(*) Journal not covered by EconLit
26Table 1: Coverage of EconLit: Basic statistics
1970's 1980's 1990's
Books 5 5302 16156
Book Review 0 0 1029
Collective Volume Articles 0 35422 96307
Dissertation 0 2649 9649
Journal Article 62518 95033 156601
Working Paper 41 12215 23446
27Table 2: Number of journals in Econlit: 1970-1999































28Table 3: Summary statistics for articles in EconLit.
dataset All journals TI list
period 70's 80's 90's 70's 80's 90's
total papers 62569 95027 156454 26802 38133 52469
mean pages per paper 12.85 14.45 16.49 12.17 13.76 16.29
standard deviation (9.94) (10.27) (10.59) (8.69) (8.40) (9.08)
Authors per paper: Distribution
single-authored .753 .678 .578 .716 .616 .504
two authors .210 .256 .309 .244 .311 .371
three authors .031 .055 .090 .035 .064 .104
four or more authors .005 .011 .023 .005 .009 .020
29Table 4: Descriptive statistics for six networks based on articles in EconLit.
dataset All journals TI list
period 70's 80's 90's 70's 80's 90's
total authors 33770 48608 81217 14051 19694 28736
size of giant component 5253 13808 33027 2775 7283 14368
as percentage .156 .284 .407 .197 .370 .500
second largest component 122 30 30 74 32 31
isolated authors 16735 19315 24578 5859 5999 6156
as percentage .496 .397 .303 .417 .305 .214
average degree .894 1.244 1.672 1.058 1.467 1.896
standard deviation (1.358) (1.765) (2.303) (1.433) (1.815) (2.224)
clustering coe±cient .193 .182 .157 .188 .180 .167
Giant Component
average degree 2.48 2.77 3.06 2.48 2.70 2.95
standard deviation (2.09) (2.40) (2.93) (2.05) (2.25) (2.61)
average distance 12.86 11.07 9.47 11.99 11.12 9.69
standard deviation (4.03) (3.03) (2.23) (4.02) (3.07) (2.35)
diameter 40 36 29 33 31 26
30Table 5: Network statistics for the economists with the highest number of links.
Author Papers % Coauthored Links Distance 2 Clust.Coe®
1970s
tollison rd 44 0.955 25 57 0.053
heady eo 30 0.833 23 13 0.028
feldstein ms 73 0.288 21 40 0.024
schmitz a 23 0.870 20 29 0.042
smith vk 72 0.514 20 26 0.032
Average top 100 23.87 0.724 11.94 25.67 0.062
Average all 2.35 0.243 0.89 0.193
1980s
mccarl ba 36 0.889 35 97 0.022
thisse jf 34 0.971 30 80 0.055
lee cf 36 1.000 29 106 0.030
whalley j 52 0.808 29 44 0.022
schmitz a 26 0.846 26 118 0.058
Average top 100 28.42 0.827 16.36 49.80 0.062
Average all 2.65 0.315 1.24 0.182
1990s
thisse jf 66 0.970 54 244 0.022
lee j 58 0.586 45 158 0.019
sirmans cf 67 1.000 41 172 0.045
nijkamp p 67 0.940 41 57 0.034
michel p 48 0.938 34 169 0.036
Average top 100 37.69 0.849 25.31 99.40 0.043
Average all 2.82 0.409 1.67 0.157
31Table 6: Error and attack tolerance of the
network based on all articles in EconLit.
period 70's 80's 90's
Size of the giant component (in perc.)
Whole network .156 .284 .407
w/o random 2% .149 .276 .398
w/o random 5% .137 .263 .389
w/o top 2% .002 .067 .256
w/o top 5% .000 .001 .001
Average distance within giant component
Whole network 12.86 11.07 9.47
w/o random 2% 12.88 11.17 9.58
w/o random 5% 12.89 11.21 9.68
w/o top 2% 9.26 29.80 19.00
w/o top 5% 2.64 5.71 8.91
Clustering coe±cient
Whole network .193 .182 .157
w/o random 2% .193 .183 .158
w/o random 5% .192 .182 .157
w/o top 2% .318 .280 .250
w/o top 5% .440 .380 .344
32Table 7: Simulation experiment to control for changes in size and degree in the
networks.
dataset All journals TI list
sample size 200 200 200 1000 1000 1000
period 70's 80's 90's 70's 80's 90's
total authors 33770 33770 33770 14051 14051 14051
average degree .67 .67 .67 .90 .90 .90
giant component (as perc.) .090 .110 .116 .151 .169 .169
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.008) (.009)
isolated authors (as perc.) .580 .583 .585 .471 .471 .472
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
clustering coe±cient .146 .141 .151 .160 .155 .162
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.006)
Giant Component
average degree 2.28 2.30 2.31 2.36 2.33 2.34
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02)
average distance 14.50 15.47 15.47 12.97 14.84 14.84
(.56) (.70) (.87) (.52) (.84) (.98)
diameter 42 43 42 37 41 41
(4.1) (4.2) (4.7) (4.2) (4.5) (5.0)
Networks are adjusted by; 1) deleting nodes randomly until the order is 33770 (14051);
2) deleting links randomly until the average degree is .67 (.90). The sample mean is given
without parentheses. The sample standard deviation is given in parentheses.
33Table 8: Test statistics to test hypotheses that other factors than the increase in
average degree have contributed to the emergence of a small world.
dataset All journals TI list
test statistic t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon
H0 Ha
~ ngc;19800s = ~ ngc;19700s ~ ngc;19800s > ~ ngc;19700s 53.82 17.30 58.68 35.86
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
~ ngc;19900s = ~ ngc;19800s ~ ngc;19900s > ~ ngc;19800s 14.03 11.62 1.75 1.34
(.000) (.000) (.041) (.090)
~ d19800s = ~ d19700s ~ d19800s < ~ d19700s 15.26 12.53 59.94 37.17
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
~ d19900s = ~ d19800s ~ d19900s < ~ d19800s .09 .35 -.31 -.30
(.535) (.637) (.438) (.384)
All tests are one-sided. The Wilcoxon test statistic is normalized to compare to the t-statistic.
p-values are given in parentheses
34Table 9: Network statistics for two networks based on articles in two ¯xed subsets
of journals.
data set Entire perioda Core journalsb
period 70's 80's 90's 70's 80's 90's
total authors 22960 27539 32773 3186 3387 3171
size of giant component 3076 5899 10054 237 608 779
as percentage .134 .214 .307 .074 .180 .246
isolated authors 11260 11062 10572 1507 1143 701
as percentage .490 .402 .323 .473 .337 .221
average degree .885 1.134 1.386 .833 1.142 1.429
standard deviation (1.312) (1.508) (1.695) (1.095) (1.279) (1.405)
clustering coe±cient .198 .218 .216 .253 .259 .257
Giant Component
average degree 2.45 2.62 2.70 2.45 2.45 2.55
standard deviation (2.03) (2.11) (2.18) (1.80) (1.77) (1.82)
average distance 12.15 12.63 12.33 7.94 11.92 11.02
standard deviation (3.75) (3.65) (3.36) (3.43) (5.22) (4.12)
diameter 29 37 34 22 33 29
a Network is based on articles in journals that appear in EconLit for the entire sample period
from 1970 to 1999.
b Network is based on articles in American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political
Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Review of Economic Studies.
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37Figure 1Figure 2Figure 3: Local network of J. Stiglitz in 1990’s
Note: Some economists might appear twice or are missing due to the use of different initials or misspellings in EconLit.Figure 4: Local network of J. Tirole in 1990’s
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KNOW 32.2003  Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_  
PRIV 33.2003  Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture? 
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ETA 43.2003  Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific 
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SIEV 65.2003  Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy 
SIEV 66.2003  Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment 
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